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A Canyon Apart:

Immigration Politics and Hispanic
Mobilization in Arizona
Peter Morrissey, FCRH ’11

POLITICAL SCIENCE

This article examines the political and social forces surrounding the April 23, 2010 passage of
Arizona’s stringent immigration enforcement measure, Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, which empowered local law enforcement to demand proof of legal residency from any person suspected of being undocumented. A person’s failure to produce documentation would result in arrest, detention, investigation, and potentially deportation to his or her nation of origin. Through the law’s
lens, the article explores the development of the social tension that followed Arizona’s explosive
population growth, and examines how Arizona’s large Hispanic population has been unable to
assert itself at the ballot box or in statewide government. The article argues that the political
exigencies of Arizona are dissimilar from the other border states, explaining why measures such
as S.B. 1070 have failed elsewhere. The author employs local and national news sources from
the time of the the bill’s consideration, U.S. Census Bureau population data, and case studies and
journal articles on Hispanic political organization to explore this unique and fascinating battle
over public policy, society, and identity.
Immigration has long been among the most contentious issues in the United States, striking at the nexus
of American identity, law, security, and justice. Given
this extraordinary degree of overlapping complexity, it
is not surprising that political firestorms flare around
the issue with relative frequency. The most recent immigration-related battle concerns Arizona lawmakers’
aggressive attempt to address this challenge through
the now-famous Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070. This state law
directly penalizes undocumented immigrants on the
state level, and represents the most drastic measures
taken by any state to address illegal immigration. The
resulting furor has polarized the state along racial,
ethnic, and political lines. This study will explore S.B.
1070, its components, and the political environment in
which it became law. Through this lens, it will examine
(1.) how this law is unique to the social circumstances
of Arizona and (2.) why Arizona’s growing Hispanic
population has been unable to achieve political influence. Toward this second question, the article will examine why Arizona’s Hispanics were so unsuccessful
at blocking a law they detested, and why non-Hispanic
residents were generally supportive of the measure.

First, it is important to clarify terminology. In this paper, the term Hispanic will be used to refer to Americans and Arizonans of Latin American origin and extraction; it should be understood as functionally the
same as Latino when used in the popular sense. One’s
assignment as Hispanic or Latino is primarily determined through self-identification and both identifiers are used by various scholarly sources and media
outlets. In the context of Arizona, Hispanic will often,
though not exclusively, refer to individuals of Mexican
origin or ancestry, as the overwhelming majority of
Hispanics in said state are in some way linked to Mexico. Furthermore, there is a great deal of discussion of
“Hispanic issues,” an imprecise but necessary group of
political issues historically linked to this group. These
include, but are not limited to, immigration, bilingual
education, and law enforcement practices. While it is
naïve and inaccurate to paint Hispanics, Arizonans,
Mexican-Americans, or even two residents of the same
block in Tucson with one broad stroke, for the purposes of this paper it will sometimes be necessary.
It is first important to examine the elements and passage of the contentious law in question. Immigration
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There are three major components of the law, which in
the words of one of its statehouse supporters, will stem
the tide of immigrants who will come back “larger,
stronger, and more destructive than they were several
years ago” (Rossi, 2010). First, the law establishes as
a state (and not federal, as per past precedent) misdemeanor an alien’s presence in Arizona without proper
identification on one’s person. Second, the law bars
state or local officials from restricting enforcement
of federal immigration laws. This measure applies to
both so-called “sanctuary cities” and individual police
departments which restrain their officers from demanding identification. Finally and most significantly,
the law empowers law enforcement officers to demand
proof of legal residency if they have “reasonable suspicion” of an individual’s illegal status. Taken together,
the law constitutes an extraordinarily aggressive attempt to toughen in-state immigration enforcement,
rather than border security (Rossi, 2010).
After its passage by the state legislature, the bill went
to the desk of Republican Governor Jan Brewer, who
ascended to the office following Democrat Janet Napolitano’s resignation to become President Obama’s
Secretary of Homeland Security. While Napolitiano
had repeatedly vetoed enforcement-only immigration
bills (Archibold, 2010a) and testified to the Senate that
she would have vetoed this one (Gorman & Riccardi,
2010), Governor Brewer remained silent during the
course of the bill’s legislative debate. Local news sources documented a number of competing interests as she
considered whether to sign or veto the bill. Aides said
her initial concerns over the racial-profiling implications of the law had been partially allayed by a line-byhttps://fordham.bepress.com/furj/vol1/iss1/5

line reading with its primary sponsor. Messages from
citizens regarding the law were, according to one of her
assistants, “running three-to-one in favor” (Phoenix
News, 2010). Politics played a role in Brewer’s decision as well: she was facing a challenge in the August
Republican gubernatorial primary, and had damaged
her bona fides among influential conservatives by advocating for a 1% increase in the state sales tax to avoid
cuts in public services (Archibold, 2010a). With these
considerations in mind, Governor Brewer signed S.B.
1070 into law on April 23, 2010.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

is a staple of Arizona politics, but the intensity surrounding the issue reached a fever pitch in March 2010,
when rancher Brian Krentz of Cochise County was
killed while walking his dog. As rumors swirled, law
enforcement was unable to determine who had killed
Krentz. Public sentiment concluded that the killer was
an illegal alien who fled back to Mexico after the murder (Thornburgh, 2010). The state legislature, mired
in a budget crisis and desperate for distraction, turned
its attention to immigration reform, with supporters of
punitive reform arguing that any bill should be named
after Krentz, who was quickly becoming the posterchild for state-level legislation. Several years-worth of
attempts to pass a more stringent immigration bill were
frantically combined to produce S.B. 1070, the Support
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,
which passed both chambers that April.
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Not surprisingly, the passage of S.B. 1070 caused a
massive national uproar. Supporters claimed a victory
for states’ rights and national security and a rebuke
aimed at an inept and unconcerned federal government. President Obama dubbed the law “misguided”
and worried that it would “undermine basic notions
of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as
the trust between police and our communities that
is so crucial to keeping us safe” (Archibold, 2010a).
Mexican President Felipe Calderon termed the law a
“violation of human rights” which “opens the door to
intolerance and hatred” (Booth, 2010). Law enforcement officers were split between chiefs and rank-andfile officers: while the Arizona Association of Chiefs of
Police criticized the law as “problematic,” the Phoenix
Law Enforcement Association (the largest police union
in the state) supported it (Johnson, 2010). Los Angeles
Cardinal Roger Mahoney summed up the reaction of
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops when he blasted Arizona for “reverting to German Nazi and Russian
Communist techniques whereby people are required
to turn one another in to the authorities on any suspicion of documentation” (Watanabe, 2010). And, of
course, the Phoenix Suns famously wore “Los Suns”
jerseys in solidarity with Arizona’s immigrant community, broadening the court of public opinion ever more.
S.B. 1070’s fate, however, will likely be decided in a
different sort of court. A number of advocacy organizations, ranging from the National Council of La
Raza (NCLR) to the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), filed lawsuits against the law, but a suit filed
by the Justice Department carried the most weight. In
July, Judge Susan Bolton, a U.S. District Court Judge
for the Federal District of Arizona, issued a preliminary injunction in response to the Justice Department’s suit, writing that “preserving the status quo
through a preliminary injunction is less harmful than
allowing state laws that are likely pre-empted by federal law to be enforced” (Archibold, 2010b). Essentially,
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Judge Bolton based her opinion on the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause, under which immigration (along
with other political issues) is delegated exclusively to
federal authorities. She was also sympathetic to opponents who argued along less procedural grounds,
finding that “there is a substantial likelihood that officers will mistakenly arrest legal resident aliens,” and
that Arizona was imposing a “‘distinct, unusual and
extraordinary’ burden on legal resident aliens that only
the federal government has the authority to impose”
(Archibold, 2010b). Unsurprisingly, Arizona appealed
the decision, and the case is working its way through
the courts. The bill’s original sponsor, Senator Russell
Pearce, expects it to be ultimately decided by the Supreme Court (Rau, 2010).
The next logical step in the analysis of S.B. 1070 is, unsurprisingly, where does the law go from here? With
anti-immigrant rhetoric a popular centerfold of modern politicking, it would be expected that bills similar
to S.B. 1070 would appear in state legislatures around
the region. Surprisingly, however, this is not the case.
While a few individual state legislators have voiced
their support, Arizona’s law has not been replicated
in the border region since its passage. The opinions
of the other border-state politicians are significant, as
theirs are the only states that can begin to approximate
the social and political challenges facing Arizona and
help determine if S.B. 1070 was a unique phenomenon.
Democratic Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico,
the only Hispanic governor in the country, condemned
the bill as “against the democratic ideals of this country.” California’s Arnold Schwarzenegger, a centrist
Republican (and immigrant), responded by saying
“this is very clearly something we will not do here in
California.” But most remarkable in his opposition was
Texas’ conservative Republican Governor Rick Perry.
Perry, a pistol-packing favorite of the Tea Party, said
that Arizona’s law “would not be the right direction for
Texas” and would distract law enforcement from fighting other crimes (Spagat, 2010). Interestingly, none
opposed the law on the grounds of Bolton’s Supremacy
argument; rather, three governors from all across the
political spectrum (left, center-right, and far-right) all
signaled concern with the substance of the bill and not
just its constitutional propriety.
Hispanics in Arizona also signaled their displeasure.
One local poll suggested that 81% of Hispanic registered voters in the state opposed the law’s passage
(Gonzalez, 2010). In fact, some so deplored it that between April and November roughly 100,000 Hispanics
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left Arizona, with nearly 25,000 returning to Mexico
(Stevensen, 2010). With 1.7 million Hispanics in Arizona, it is truly remarkable that nearly one in seventeen Arizona Hispanics left following the law’s passage.
These two pieces of data are inspirations for the second portion of this undertaking. Arizona Hispanics
are both overwhelmingly opposed to the law and quite
numerous in the state, and yet S.B. 1070 advanced
through the legislature with relatively little difficulty.
To understand this, it is crucial to examine Arizona’s
unique demographics and their social implications.
The 2005-2007 American Community Survey provides the best, most recent Census population updates,
and according to its estimates, self-identifying Hispanics constitute 29.0% of Arizona’s population, some
1.7 million people out of a population of 6.1 million
(US Census Bureau, 2008). Within this population
(both of Hispanics and statewide), undocumented immigrants constitute a sizeable chunk of Arizonans: a
Department of Homeland Security report from 2009
estimated that 460,000 undocumented immigrants (almost entirely of Latin American origin, and more than
any Western state, save for California) reside in Arizona, meaning that undocumented immigrants constitute roughly 27% of Arizona Hispanics, and 7.5%
of the state as a whole. Indeed, the nearly 700-mile
long border between Arizona and Mexico has been
the entry point for roughly 40% of all border-crossers
from Mexico through much of this decade (Economist,
2006). Given these two figures, it is not surprising that
illegal immigration is a highly publicized, visible issue
in Arizona.
Further contributing to the significance and central
status of immigration as a political issue in Arizona
is the rapidly changing nature of the state. The massive growth that Arizona has experienced in the last
thirty years has contributed to a constantly changing
society as successive waves of newcomers (from north
and south alike) have reinvented Arizona. It has grown
faster than nearly every other state, quadrupling in
population since 1970 (US Census Bureau, 2009). This
growth can be attributed mainly to two sources. First
and obviously, Hispanic immigration, particularly
from Mexico, is an enormous contributor to Arizona’s
population boom. But second, Arizona welcomed
thousands of out-of-state, often out-of-region, nonHispanics from northern cities (“Sunbirds”). This
particular group is significant to examining the social
strain Arizona underwent throughout the last decades
as its population evolved. Arizona’s Hispanics find
3

Another aspect of this growth in Arizona’s population
is evident in the settlement patterns of newcomers: the
state, for all intents and purposes, is remarkably segregated. Maricopa County, the state’s largest, is the most
instructive example of this divide. Using the New York
Times’ recently published “Mapping America” American Community Survey census tool, a cursory glance
across the county underscores the extraordinary divide
(2010). Most precincts in the city of Phoenix proper,
(aside from a small cosmopolitan downtown area) are
overwhelmingly Hispanic, with census tracts in densely
populated eastern Phoenix approaching 90% Hispanic.
However, the suburbs surrounding the city (yet still
within the county) are quite the opposite: most precincts in suburban Scottsdale, for example, are nearly
80% white. Outside of Maricopa County, this degree
of racial stratification continues: Hispanics comprise
huge majorities of several southern border counties,
such as Santa Cruz County, which in 2008 was approximately 80% Hispanic. While in the northern part of the
state, Hispanics are far more scarce; Cococcino County
is barely 12% Hispanic. Given this data, it is highly
plausible that a white resident of Arizona is acutely
aware of immigration as a political issue, and associates said immigration with Hispanic Arizonans. However, given the relative lack of social integration in the
state, it is unlikely that that resident has many interpersonal relationships with Hispanics to dampen attitudes
based solely on the perception of illegal immigration
as a “problem.” Conversely, an Arizona Hispanic has
relatively few natural outlets to develop social bonds
with non-Hispanic Arizonans, as Hispanics are highly
localized.
Though the entire border region grew quickly and reinvented itself dramatically in the past thirty years, its
other three states all have more well-established Hispanic populations and non-Hispanic populations with
longer histories and stronger bonds with immigrants
and Mexico than Arizona. The more well-established
bonds prevent the sort of social stratification that enables socially-divisive laws like S.B. 1070 to pass with
enormous support. In New Mexico in 2000, for exhttps://fordham.bepress.com/furj/vol1/iss1/5

ample, fully 88% of adult Hispanics were native New
Mexicans and therefore, American citizens by birth,
demonstrating the longstanding influence and stability
of that community (Garcia & Sierra, 2004). New Mexico’s Hispanic population is, proportionally, the highest in the nation at 45% of the state’s total, and equal
to that of whites. Though California and Texas do not
have similarly high rates of native-born Hispanics (at
61% and 68%, respectively) each has a strong history of
well-organized Hispanic advocacy (Pew Hispanic Center). In California, for example, “the post-World War II
period spawned Unity Leagues that attacked discrimination and fought for greater political representation”
(Navarro & Mejia, 2004), culminating in the return of
Hispanic representation to the Los Angeles City Council in 1949 after seventy years absence. Similarly, in the
1960s Hispanic college students in Texas were remarkably influential in pressuring administrators to recruit
more Mexican-American students, offer more ethnicspecific scholarships and grants, and establish courses
and programs relating to the Mexican American experience (Navarro & Mejia, 2008). Advocacy for the
needs of and challenges facing Hispanic communities
in other border states was well established and remarkably successful for decades before most of the current
residents of Arizona arrived in the region. Between
2000 and 2010, the population of Hispanics in Arizona
increased by nearly 50% (more than any other border
state), signaling the recentness of the arrival of many
of today’s Hispanics. Thus, Arizonans lacked the same
social and communitarian bonds that make the other
border states more socially cohesive and responsive to
organized Hispanic advocacy.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

themselves in a unique sort of “demographic donut
hole”, numerous enough that they are associated with
immigration issues and highly present in the eyes of
the rest of the state, yet not so numerous that they can
meaningfully advocate policy changes or rebut aggressive legislation. Further contributing to this lack of influence is the poorly mobilized nature of this community and its relative lack of political engagement.
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In addition, however, to disadvantageous demographics and a less-than-cohesive history, another challenge
facing Arizona Hispanics is a remarkably poor degree
of political organization, resulting in greatly diminished political advocacy potential. At both the mass
and elite levels, Arizona’s Hispanic population is not
capable of leveraging its sizable numbers toward the
advancement of policy goals. The first, most basic
issue is the low turnout rate among Hispanic voters.
Despite representing 29% of the state’s population,
Hispanics made up only 16% of Arizona voters in the
2008 Presidential election (Lopez, 2008). Even taking
into account the proportion of Arizona Hispanics who
are ineligible to vote, Arizona Hispanics still failed to
represent themselves strongly at the polls. Looking
back on the 2000 election, Hispanic voters’ apathy is
brought into even starker relief. Arizona’s ballot fea-
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tured a proposition (Proposition 203) that would have
ended bilingual education in public schools. Despite
overwhelming opposition among Latino advocacy
groups, Proposition 203’s presence “did not substantially increase voter turnout among the Latino electorate” (Garcia & Sierra, 2004). Given these data, it is
clear that Arizona Hispanics endemically fail to assert
themselves at the polls.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

The implications of Arizona Hispanics’ absence is felt
in the dearth of Hispanic officeholders. The National
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials
reported that, as of 2010, only 16% of the Arizona legislature was Hispanic. In contrast, New Mexico’s legislature is 44% Hispanic, California’s is 23%, and Texas’s
is 20% (Spagat, 2010). While Hispanics’ representation
in both California and Texas’s legislatures falls below
their numbers statewide, they are appreciably closer
than Arizona’s. These statistics illustrate why S.B. 1070
was able to pass the Arizona legislature with relatively
little fanfare. Certainly, a higher proportion of visible
Hispanic public officials would have helped drive public opposition.
The implications of the lack of political mobilization of
Hispanic voters are clear. Given their degree of underrepresentation, both political parties in Arizona lack
an incentive to aggressively seek out Hispanic preferences and craft appealing policy positions: Arizona Republicans can win elections without appreciable Hispanic support, while Democrats take Hispanic support
as a foregone conclusion. New Mexico Republicans
specifically recruited an Hispanic gubernatorial candidate, while California Democrats were able to survive
the 2010 wave because of successful Hispanic-outreach
efforts (Sharry, 2010). In Texas, of course, the most
famous conservative Republican of the past century,
George W. Bush, aggressively supported comprehensive immigration reform both in Austin and in Washington, recognizing Hispanics as the future of his party
in his home state. S.B. 1070, thus, is partially the result
of a lack of Hispanic political engagement.
Two possible explanations for this failure of Hispanic
voter mobilization are germane to Arizona and deserve
brief treatment. First, Arizona’s status as a strongly
anti-labor state deprives Hispanic advocacy groups
of natural organizing ground. While national labor
unions have sometimes bemoaned immigrant-friendly
legislation which they believe drives down wages at the
state-level, in the southwest Hispanic advocacy groups
and labor unions have been tightly bound. The most
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famous example is the United Farm Workers in California, who are credited with greatly expanding Hispanic political influence in that state by employing
organizing tactics and providing a mouthpiece for Hispanic leaders who shared policy concerns with nonHispanics, thereby increasing multiethnic political
cooperation (Navarro & Mejia, 2004). Indeed, to the
extent that they exist, Arizona’s labor unions strongly
opposed S.B. 1070, even organizing boycotts of state
attractions after its passage (Phoenix Business Journal,
2010). However, their impact was marginal given that
their organizational strength is minimal: only 6.5% of
Arizona employees are dues-paying union members,
while 17.2% of Californian workers are unionized (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Much of this disparity
is legalistic in nature: Arizona is a right-to-work state,
making the formation of new unions much more difficult (National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation). Without this historic linkage, Arizona Hispanics lose a potent political organizing mechanism.
A second aspect of the lack of meaningful Hispanic
voter mobilization is found in an examination of the
proliferation of Hispanic advocacy organizations.
The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) is the nation’s largest grassroots Hispanic advocacy group, with 115,000 members in more than 600
chapters nationwide. LULAC’s policy focus is political advocacy at the state and local levels, and it has
successfully advocated for bilingual education, challenged discriminatory legislation in court, and pushed
for access to voting in heavily Hispanic communities
(Martinez, 2009). But in Arizona, there are only 14
local councils, in contrast to 46 in New Mexico, 82 in
California, and an astounding 291 in Texas where LULAC was founded (League of United Latin American
Citizens Online). Given this lack of grassroots infrastructure, it is unsurprising that Arizona Hispanics are
relatively disengaged.
The above analysis paints a fairly bleak picture for Arizona Hispanics. S.B. 1070, a bill shunned outside of
Arizona, is the result of both massive, recently-arrived
populations and poorly established Hispanic communities, and the absence of meaningful Hispanic political organization, union establishment, and advocacy
groups. However, just as it was in California, Texas,
and New Mexico, the tide of history is against the
supporters of S.B. 1070. A first reason, of course, is
continued demographic shifts. Texas, California, and
New Mexico have joined Hawaii as majority-minority
American states, states in which groups classified as
5

The second evolution, however, may be more significant. It is possible that Arizona Hispanics may be able
to reverse their political disorganization through the
most unlikely device imaginable: the galvanizing detestation of S.B. 1070 itself. While this may seem counterintuitive, it is not without historical analog. California in the 1990s was very similar to Arizona today:
huge numbers of newcomers caused considerable,
misplaced backlash against illegal immigrants, and
spurred the passage of the infamous Proposition 187.
“Prop 187” denied all public services to undocumented
immigrants, establishing citizenship checks in order to
receive public education, health care, and food stamps.
The effort to place Proposition 187 on the 1994 ballot
was orchestrated by California’s Republican Governor
Pete Wilson, who stoked public dissatisfaction with illegal immigration in order to orchestrate a come-frombehind reelection campaign. While Wilson managed
to win, the long-term political consequences of Proposition 187 were disastrous for the California Republican Party, which has generally been unable to escape
the association with anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. Proposition 187 provided the impetus for a massive
Hispanic registration drive in California, and Republican candidates saw their average share of the Hispanic
vote fall from 35% in 1990 to 24% in 1998, with further
drop-offs occurring in the 2000s (Davies & Morgan,
2007). Absent Proposition 187, it is conceivable that
California’s Hispanics would never have organized to
the degree or at the pace they did. They are now an
integral part of any winning electoral coalition in California, and have yet to forgive California Republicans
not named Arnold Schwarzenegger. (Proposition 187
did pass, but nearly all of its provisions were struck
down on court challenges.)
An additional galvanizing feature of Proposition 187
was an easily identifiable “bogey-man”—Governor
Wilson—whose comments and tone fueled the perception that the campaign was overtly anti-Hispanic
(Barreto & Woods, 2005). Here, another parallel exists with Arizona, as two possible candidates for this
https://fordham.bepress.com/furj/vol1/iss1/5

role exist today. The first, unsurprisingly, is Governor
Brewer, who drew the additional ire of immigrants and
Mexican-Americans when she declared that “a majority of the illegal trespassers [from Mexico]…are under
the direction and control of organized drug cartels”
(Rough, 2010). The other, perhaps more likely candidate to become the galvanizing public face of Arizona’s
Hispanic population is Maricopa County Sheriff Joe
Arpaio, who terms himself “America’s toughest sheriff ”; Sheriff Arpaio has organized a “posse” of some
three thousand volunteers who serve as freelance immigration enforcers and conduct questionably-legal
raids of heavily Hispanic neighborhoods in Phoenix
in an effort to root out undocumented immigrants
(Finnegan, 2009). Generally speaking, Arizona today
possesses many of the same political forces as California in the mid-1990s: a politically dormant but fastgrowing Hispanic population, public officials easily
harnessing anti-immigrant furor, and near-total Hispanic opposition to a controversial piece of immigration-related legislation. While there is no guarantee
that S.B. 1070 will have the same galvanizing effect as
Proposition 187, the parallels seem hopeful for Arizona Hispanics.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

racial or ethnic minorities constitute a majority of the
population. Arizona is not far behind and may join
their ranks as early as 2015 (MSNBC News, 2005).
With greater diversity comes greater political sensitivity to the needs of minority communities and greater influence therein. Arizona’s Hispanic population,
though currently not quite numerous enough to drive
political discourse, may soon have the opportunity to
do so.
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Arizona’s S.B. 1070 is an important piece of legislation not only for scholars of immigration politics and
the state-federal divide, but also because it sheds light
upon the political forces that exist uniquely in Arizona.
It is a striking combination of history, demographics,
and social politics, which make such a law not only
plausible but perhaps unavoidable. Furthermore, the
failure of Arizona’s Hispanic population and its advocates to rally public opinion against it is indicative
of the challenges of Hispanic political organization in
Arizona. S.B. 1070 provides a fascinating (if convoluted) cross-section of society, politics, and culture in
America’s fastest growing region and among America’s
fastest growing demographic. Its example will be instructive in identity battles for years to come.
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